Trends in Church Life: The Spiritual Revolution by Woodhead, Linda
page 5
T
Trends in Church Life: 
The Spiritual Revolution
Linda Woodhead
If the proverbial Martian were to be sent to earth in 2005 to survey 
the state of Christianity, she might well find herself perplexed. A 
quick perusal of David Barrett’s World Christian Encyclopedia 
(2001) would reveal that Christianity is the world’s largest religion, 
with the most extensive coverage across the globe. In many parts of 
Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa it is visibly flourishing. Yet the 
picture in Europe is very different: churches are closing and belief is 
declining. The baby boomers were born into a culture which was still 
recognisably Christian; many of their children and grandchildren lack 
even a passing acquaintance with their ancestral religion. 
Even in Europe, however, the picture is not clear-cut. The status of 
Pope John Paul II was signalled by the astonishing array of world 
leaders who attended his funeral. One of his successor’s first duties 
was to preside over a vast and enthusiastic gathering of around 800,000 
young people at the ‘World Youth Day’ held in Cologne in August 
2005. Pilgrimages are flourishing, historic churches and cathedrals 
are visited as never before (including in times of disaster), and the 
national census of a supposedly secular country like Britain reveals 
that almost 72% of the population identify themselves as Christian. 
The USA muddies the waters still further. In many ways it remains 
the paradigmatic secular state, yet in George W. Bush it has twice 
elected a president who sees himself as mandated by God to uphold 
conservative evangelical Christian values in America. 
So our Martian scratches her bulbous green head as she tries to 
prepare her report on the current state of Christianity. She has plenty 
of striking fragments of evidence, but how on earth is she to assemble 
them into a coherent picture? Although I am not confident of being 
able to help her produce a report which will satisfy her Martian line 
managers, I do think it is possible to detect some patterns in what has 
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been happening to Christianity in the last few decades, and to relate 
these to broader social trends. It might even be possible – however 
tentatively – to suggest some of the directions in which Christianity 
may need to develop if it is to retain active support in the West in 
coming decades. 
The Kendal Project
In order to make the task more manageable, I am going to concentrate 
on the situation in the UK today, and look outwards from that vantage 
point. In order to build on empirical evidence I am going to begin in 
the town of Kendal in Cumbria where, between October 2000 and July 
2002, a team of us from Lancaster University began a locality study 
whose aim was to map ‘contemporary patterns of the sacred’.1
For two years we tracked down every form of religion and spirituality 
we could find in this town of 28,000 people, observed their characteristic 
activities, and interviewed those involved. We found that the religious 
and spiritual associational activities of Kendal could be divided into 
two camps: what we came to speak of as ‘the congregational domain’ 
and the ‘holistic milieu’. The congregational domain was relatively 
easy to survey, for it was made up of churches, chapels, meeting 
houses and Kingdom Halls, all with a Christian basis and a weekly 
congregational worship service (there are no significant immigrant 
groups in Kendal, and it remains a strikingly ‘white’ town). The holistic 
milieu was harder to map. Its activities took the form either of group 
meetings or one-to-one consultations, and took place in a wide variety 
of settings – private homes, rented rooms, the sports centre, dedicated 
complementary therapy centres. There was, moreover, a huge range 
of different activities – from Tai Chi to Yoga, from a Greenspirit 
Group to a Wild Women group, from Circle Dancing to Sai Baba. We 
concentrated our research only on those activities identified by their 
facilitators as having a clear spiritual dimension, and excluded from 
consideration such things as Yoga groups which concentrated only on 
enhancing physical health or mental calm. 
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The separation and distinctness of the congregational domain and the 
holistic milieu surprised us. Very few people were active in both, and it 
quickly became clear that this was due to the very different orientation 
of the two spheres. In the congregational domain attention was 
focused on ‘higher good’ – on God, scripture, sacraments, morality, 
and the church community (the emphasis fell differently in different 
congregations and denominations). In the holistic milieu, by contrast, 
attention was focused inwards upon the lives, bodies and emotions of 
the individual (their ‘subjective lives’). The sacred was identified not 
with that which transcends one’s own unique life and to which this life 
should be conformed, but with that which is identified as one’s true 
spiritual ‘core’. 
By counting the numbers involved in the congregational domain and 
holistic milieu, and by undertaking some longitudinal research, we 
found that although the former outnumbered the latter by a ratio of 
4:1 at the time of our research (7.9% of the population of Kendal were 
active in the congregational domain, 1.6% in the holistic milieu), the 
congregational domain was declining and the holistic milieu was 
expanding – rapidly. If the current rates of change were sustained, the 
holistic milieu would begin to overtake the congregational domain in 
about forty years’ time. With this finding in mind we entitled the book 
we wrote about the project The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is 
Giving Way to Spirituality (Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead, 2005). 
We were not predicting some ‘age of Aquarius’ in which holistic 
spirituality sweeps the world; even if spirituality does continue to 
grow at the present rate it will not make up for congregational decline 
– in other words, overall secularisation will continue in Britain. 
The subjectivisation thesis 
The bearing of these findings on trends in church life is obvious: 
churches in the UK, most of Europe, and even the USA,2 have been 
declining fast since the 1970s, and there is no sign of a slowdown in 
the rate of decline.3 Secularisation has an impact at three levels: on 
the lives of individuals (declining Christian belief, declining church 
attendance), on the lives of congregations and denominations (which 
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have to make hard decisions as numbers and finances shrink), and on 
the life of society – locally, regionally and nationally (as Christianity 
loses social power and visibility). 
This is all important and well established. Less widely discussed is 
another main finding of the Kendal Project: that forms of religion and 
spirituality which resource the lives of individuals and enhance personal 
wellbeing are doing well, whilst those which require individual lives 
and wellbeing to be subordinated or sacrificed to some higher good 
are doing badly. How to explain this? In The Spiritual Revolution we 
suggest that ‘subjectivised’ forms of religion and spirituality – those 
which speak to and resource personal subjective life – are faring 
well chiefly because they chime in with a widespread cultural ‘turn 
to the self’. One of the most perceptive commentators on the latter, 
Charles Taylor (1991), describes it as ‘the massive subjective turn 
of modern culture, a new form of inwardness, in which we come to 
think of ourselves as creatures with inner depths’ (p. 26) and rely on 
our innermost feelings and thoughts as the ultimate authority in our 
lives (see also Taylor, 1989). It is this cultural turn, we suggest, which 
explains why subjectively focused forms of ‘spirituality’ are growing 
at the expense of traditional forms of religion which subordinate 
projects of the self to some higher good – an hypothesis we label the 
‘subjectivisation thesis’. 
In The Spiritual Revolution we offer a concise and fairly abstract 
account of the subjectivisation thesis. If one begins to put more 
historical flesh on its bare theoretical bones, I think that its power 
to illuminate recent trends in church life can be enhanced – not least 
because such historical contextualisation highlights issues of gender 
and power which seem to me to lie at the heart of the subjective turn. 
The place to begin is the immediate post-Second World War period 
in the West. This neglected period was characterised by hope (for a 
new and better era) as well as by fear (of unionised working class 
power and the growing ‘threat’ of communism). It witnessed a strange 
mixture of audacious hope and optimism – expressed in grand projects 
aimed at remodelling many aspects of society – and of anxious longing 
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for tradition and security. One result was the brief but widespread 
triumph of an ethos of benevolent paternalism. Western societies 
were run by relatively small numbers of powerful men (politicians, 
captains of industry, churchmen, local community leaders) who 
generally knew one another, retained power for themselves, and were 
inspired by an ideal of benevolent paternalism – of working selflessly 
to shape a welfare-based post-war society which would be better for 
all its members. Such paternalism also held sway at the domestic 
level, for the immediate post-war era witnessed a nostalgic yearning 
for the security of home and family and ‘traditional’ gender roles as 
women were encouraged to return to the home and the duties of full-
time unpaid care, and fathers were expected to earn ‘the family wage’ 
(Tyler May, 1999). Paternalism also triumphed at the intermediate 
level of society in the clubs, societies and political parties which 
flourished at this time, and which were run by men or committees 
of men (reverend fathers, management committees, chairmen), with 
women’s organisations as ‘auxiliary’. 
It was against such benevolent paternalism – and the fathers of society 
– that growing numbers of people began to rebel from the 1960s 
onwards. Erica Jong summed up the rebellion in her iconic novel Fear 
of Flying (1973) when she narrated her semi-autobiographical tale of 
‘the gods, the daddies, who had failed’ (2003, p. 285). The rebellion 
began amongst students in the late 1960s, and gradually spread 
to affect young people more generally, including the many women 
inspired by feminism and/or the new sexual, educational and economic 
opportunities opening to them (Marwick, 1999). The resulting change 
in ethos has been enormous. One has only to look at a TV commercial 
from the 1950s (or even 1970s) to see how stereotypes of authoritative 
men and domesticated (and/or sexualised) women which now make 
us cringe were once an accepted part of quotidian life. 
Trends in church life 
If we sharpen our understanding of the subjective turn by 
contextualising it in this way, it becomes clearer not only why it took 
place, but also why it had such a devastating impact on the churches. 
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Large numbers of men and women, faced with new opportunities, 
rebelled against the control of the fathers of society. They wanted 
a greater share in social power, they refused to defer, they rejected 
the roles prescribed for them. Since most churches were also run by 
(reverend) fathers who assumed paternal control over their ‘children’, 
the same dynamics were at play. Insofar as churches underscored and 
legitimated paternalistic social roles, they suffered. As Callum Brown 
(2001) has argued persuasively, this was particularly the case for those 
women who rejected the models of domesticated femininity which the 
churches had tended to support and endorse. In breaking away from 
paternalism, new generations of women also began to break away 
from forms of Christianity with which it had become associated.
Two types of church might be expected to escape this fate after the 
1960s. First, churches which continue to defend paternal power – but 
which succeed in catering to a niche market which rejects the subjective 
turn and seeks a return to traditional gender roles and ‘family values’. 
Second, churches which revise or abandon paternalism, and present 
the sacred in a way which is found to be fruitful for the growth and 
development of personal subjective life. 
In Kendal we found this expectation fulfilled. On the one hand 
there were a few very conservative congregations like the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses which had done relatively well since the 1970s, perhaps by 
virtue of the extremely clear roles, duties, hopes and explanations they 
offer their members (though the expansion of these congregations now 
appears to have come to a halt – perhaps because their niche market 
is exhausted). On the other hand, we found that the other category of 
congregation which has done relatively well in recent decades (though 
again with a recent slow down) is that of congregations and groups 
influenced by charismatic renewal, both Protestant and Catholic. 
Instead of going as far down the road of subjectivisation as holistic 
spirituality, most charismatic-influenced congregations manage 
to blend elements of objective religion (clear scriptural teaching, a 
moderately conservative message about gender roles and certainly 
about sexuality) with more subjectivised offerings, most notably 
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a style of worship and engagement with the sacred which has a 
direct and powerful impact upon personal mood, experience, and 
development. Thus charismatic Christianity really took off after the 
1970s when it merged with evangelical Biblicism to form charismatic 
evangelical congregations, or with Catholic sacramentalism to form 
pentecostal Catholic groups. The subjective focus of pentecostalism 
is tempered and channelled by the ‘objective’ container of the Bible 
or the sacraments. 
The success of both these varieties of Christianity – conservative 
counter-cultural Christianity and conservative experiential Christianity 
– has, of course, been even greater outside the UK. Most striking of all 
has been the charismatic upsurge that has taken place in many parts 
of the southern hemisphere from the 1970s onwards (Martin, 2001). 
This growth has been so extensive that it has allowed Christianity to 
maintain its status as the world’s largest religion despite the decline 
of Christianity in the West, and despite the upsurge of Islam. In 
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia charismatic 
Christianity proves particularly successful in assisting uprooted and 
recently-urbanised populations in adjusting to the demands of a global 
capitalist economy, whilst retaining a firm bedrock of social support 
undergirded by clear moral guidelines (Woodhead, 2004). Charismatic 
Christianity allows women a significant degree of spiritual autonomy, 
without undermining an overarching paternal framework (Cucchiari, 
1991). 
Charismatic evangelicalism has also been successful in the USA, 
and partly accounts for the greater strength of the churches in that 
country than in Europe. Equally, however, many less experiential, less 
subjectivised forms of Christianity continue to do well in the USA, 
particularly away from the seaboards with their more subjectivised 
cultures. As the success of the New Christian Right in the 1980s 
and since, and the prominent influence of a conservative Christian 
agenda in the election and presidency of George W. Bush indicate, 
conservative forms of Christianity continue to maintain a strong 
following in the USA. That they appeal to a cultural stratum which 
wishes to defend paternalistic values against the solvents of a post-
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paternal, subjectivised culture is evident from the agenda they defend: 
focused, above all, on issues of sex and gender roles and the defence 
of ‘family values’. 
In striking contrast to the success of these varieties of Christianity is 
the decline of many historic churches and denominations in the West, 
particularly those of the so-called ‘liberal mainline’ (both Catholic and 
Protestant). Though they often continue to have an important place in 
the local community, to perform rites of passage and welfare functions 
(sometimes with state support), and to attract large attendances at 
major festivals, both membership and attendance have declined 
sharply since the 1960s. Part of the explanation must surely lie in the 
fact that these were the churches which were most tightly entangled 
with the social order of the immediate post-war years. They tended 
to support and echo the ethos of benevolent paternalism, with some 
playing a role nationally in the creation of the welfare state, locally 
in their legitimation of the local social order, and domestically in 
their support for traditional family values and gender roles. During 
the 1950s many such churches enjoyed an increase in membership 
and attendance levels, with new churches being erected at the heart 
of new housing schemes. When benevolent paternalism began to 
fall out of favour after the 1960s, however, that which had benefited 
mainline churches began to prove a liability. Growing numbers of 
young people defected from churches they found ‘stuffy’, ‘boring’, 
‘square’ or simply ‘irrelevant’. In the 1950s churchgoing had been 
respectable, ‘the done thing’; it had marked one’s place in society and 
underlined one’s class and gender identity. By defecting one could 
mark one’s difference from the older generation and signal a desire to 
forge an identity based around different values, forms of belonging, 
and markers of status.
The decline of the mainline is somewhat ironic, however, given 
that these were the churches most likely to be committed to liberal 
humanistic values – as exemplified in some of the documents of Vatican 
II and, in a more extreme way, in the Tillichian liberalism which came 
to public notice in the UK in the debate aroused by the publication 
of John Robinson’s Honest to God (1963). More research is required 
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to explain why such liberalism proved insufficient to capture and 
retain the allegiance of the younger baby boomers, but a number of 
possibilities suggest themselves. First, that the commitment of these 
churches and their clergy to liberalism in theory (teaching, preaching 
and personal commitment) was undermined by paternalism in practice 
(in liturgy, hymnology, and – most important – in continuing male 
control of church life). Second, that Christian liberalism lost its nerve 
and failed to follow through its agenda either intellectually – in the 
face of the neo-orthodox challenge – or in practice. Third, that part 
of the reason for this failure of nerve was the increasingly visible and 
self-proclaimed success of more conservative churches after the 1960s 
– a challenge given voice by Dean Kelley’s book Why Conservative 
Churches are Growing (1972). 
The final and most important point to make in this connection is 
that liberal ‘humanisation’ is not the same as subjectivisation. Both 
processes affirm the equal value and dignity of all human beings, but 
the former gives this value an extrinsic basis (in being created by the 
father God, being made in God’s image, being redeemed by Christ), 
whereas the latter gives it an intrinsic basis (in the unique selfhood of 
each individual, or at least the potential that exists for the realisation 
of such unique selfhood). The latter therefore cuts freer from 
paternalism, and gives higher priority to individual projects of the self 
than to collective projects of humanitarian service. Humanitarianism 
can be preached because it makes a universal demand that one serve 
one’s fellow human. (In Kendal we found that this was the still core 
message in the sermons of the mainline Catholic, Anglican, Methodist 
and URC churches.) By contrast, the medium of the sermon contradicts 
the subjectivised message that true religion consists in each and every 
individual finding and forging his or her own unique path. Generally 
speaking, mainline churches – however liberal – have been good at 
telling people how to behave, but bad at offering individuals resources 
with which to deepen and expand their unique spiritual lives in their 
own ways (with exceptions that will be considered in the final section 
of this essay). 
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Trends in congregational life 
How have these trends in church life played out at the congregational 
level? Even though this may be dimly perceived and scarcely 
articulated, I think that most people who have remained faithful 
members of congregations in Britain throughout the latter part of the 
twentieth century and into the twenty-first have some awareness of 
the way in which congregational life has shifted from being relatively 
central to local and national life, to becoming increasingly marginal. 
This may be true even for congregations which have not experienced 
numerical decline, and which still play important roles in civic life. 
One way in which this sense of marginality expresses itself is in a 
growing sense of distance from the wider society. In Kendal we found 
that both clergy and church members would quite often speak of the 
world outside church in a way which indicated puzzlement, sadness, 
disquiet, distrust or hostility. A full 72% of those church members 
who returned our questionnaires (distributed amongst a representative 
sample of congregations in the town) believe that ‘society is getting 
worse’. Members of mainline churches were most likely to adopt a 
tone of gentle regret, expressing concern and disappointment – but 
not condemnation – that so many young people were alienated from 
church life. Some mainline church members expressed a desire to see 
worship and church life become ‘more relevant’ to young people, so 
that they would be able to benefit from congregational life in the way 
that they felt they themselves had done. Members of more conservative 
churches tended to be more overtly hostile to ‘the world’, and to 
condemn it for shallow materialism, consumerism and individualism. 
They were concerned that society was straying far from the Word of 
God, but convinced that if people could be brought into contact with 
the new life offered in Christ they would recognise the shallowness 
of their current worldly ‘satisfactions’. Of all the congregations in 
Kendal, it was the charismatic congregations were the most convinced 
that ‘renewal’ was just round the corner (ironically, since we undertook 
our research the most prominent of these congregations has closed 
down). 
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The last few decades have, in other words, seen congregations become 
more separate from wider society and develop clearer boundaries 
and more accentuated markers of difference. The change has been 
greatest for mainline, established and monopolistic churches – like the 
Church of Scotland, the Church of England, and the Roman Catholic 
Church in Ireland – which were formerly accustomed to a much closer 
relationship with society and much more permeable boundaries. 
Remnants of this earlier status remain in the fact that large numbers of 
people claim some nominal allegiance to such churches (or at least to 
‘Christianity’, as in the 2001 UK census), expect churches to perform 
certain functions like baptism and weddings on demand, and may 
retain a sense that the local community comes to some sort of symbolic 
focus in the local church (particularly at times of disaster). Such 
commitment is residual, however, and contrasts with the relentlessly 
declining levels of Christian knowledge and belief since the 1970s. 
‘Dissenting’ churches outside the mainline have, of course, been 
more accustomed to stand at a critical distance from society, and have 
therefore found adjustment to the present situation somewhat easier. 
Indeed one of the most interesting aspects of the situation is that in 
many ways the mainline churches have been drawing closer to the 
dissenting, ‘sectarian’ model than has previously been the case. The 
latter have always maintained a clear boundary with the wider culture; 
increasingly the old mainline is doing the same. This seems to be true 
throughout the West. It is true in the UK, where (for example), the 
current Archbishop of Canterbury has adopted such a conservative 
stance in relation to the issue of sexuality that he has virtually 
imposed silence upon the liberal wing of the Anglican Church. It is 
true in continental Europe, where official Catholicism has become 
increasingly conservative in matters of doctrine and institutional 
practice, and controlling of its clergy and teachers. And it is true in the 
USA, where liberal Christianity has been put on the defensive as never 
before – witness the travails of liberal Catholic bishops and other 
clergy, and the massive reaction against the liberal, pro-homosexual 
wing of the Episcopalian Church. 
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As these examples illustrate, the main issue around which the high 
boundaries of Christian identity have lately been erected is that of 
gender and sexuality. It is in reaction against the ‘permissive’ sexuality 
of the contemporary milieu, and in defence of a Christian commitment 
to heterosexuality and the nuclear family, that contemporary Christian 
identity is increasingly taking shape. Why should this be? Although it 
would take a great deal more work to establish the case fully, it seems 
plausible to suggest that it may be related to a nostalgia for post-war 
paternalism: for a situation in which the church and its members 
had higher status in society, men and women had clearer and more 
demarcated roles, sexuality was more tightly controlled, the family 
seemed to offer a place of security and sanctity, and Christianity was 
woven into the fabric of it all. Having said all that, it is necessary to 
make two important qualifications. 
The first is that besides the churches’ increasing distance from wider 
society – both imposed and embraced – the second main trend I would 
single out as distinctive of congregational life since the 1960s has 
been a decline in paternalism and clericalism. This point was brought 
home to me when our research in Kendal uncovered some archival 
materials, including parish newsletters from the 1960s and 70s. Even 
in the latter the tone was thoroughly paternalistic. It was not only that 
the vicar assumed a right to ‘preach’ to the congregation to whom he 
was writing, but that the newsletters were dense with comments to 
and about women which assumed that they would be occupying roles 
of service, self-sacrifice and domesticity. Such clerical paternalism 
has declined or even disappeared in a very short space of time. The 
ordination of women in some churches has been both a symptom 
and a cause of this trend, and the changing status of women in wider 
society has undoubtedly been a major factor. So too has the declining 
status of the clergy in society, even in the ‘highest’ congregations. The 
rapid decline of the Anglo-Catholic movement in the Anglican church 
may be one of the most striking symbols of this decline; despite 
continuing representation, the movement is ceasing to recruit young 
people – which may well be a sign that sacerdotalism has ceased to be 
credible in the contemporary context. (The decline in Roman Catholic 
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vocations, though often attributed solely to a rejection of the ideal of 
celibacy, may indicate something similar.) 
The second qualification to my remarks about the prominence of 
sexual issues in the construction of contemporary Christian identity 
has to do with the way in which such issues often seem to feature more 
prominently at denominational rather than congregational level. One 
reason for this may be simple reluctance or embarrassment in speaking 
about such issues, but another may be that they are of greater concern 
to church leaders than to most people in the pew – plus the fact that 
it tends to be at denominational rather than congregational level that 
issues of institutional identity and public presentation come to a focus. 
Our questionnaire research revealed that Christians do tend to be 
more conservative on sexual issues than non-Christians: 56% thought 
sex before marriage was ‘always wrong’ and 66% said the same of 
homosexual relations between consenting adults. Nevertheless, we 
did not find that sexuality was an issue which came up as frequently 
in congregational life in Kendal, contrary to what one assume if one 
based one’s knowledge on national newspapers.
In fact, at congregational level, the more important trend seems to be 
toward an identity based around a self-conscious sense of ‘community’. 
This was a word we heard many times in Kendal, and from its context 
and associations it became clear that it signalled (a) something new, or 
at least something which has become more prominent since the 1960s; 
(b) something to do with a sense of commitment to, sharing in, and 
mutual support within a congregation; (c) something ‘informal’ and 
with a mild affective dimension; (d) something which church people 
enjoy but others do not. The notion was often drawn upon in sermons, 
where a contrast was frequently drawn between the ‘community’ 
which Christians enjoy, and the ‘individualism’ which afflicts wider 
society. But talk of community was also fairly common amongst 
members of congregations, and was sometimes used in response to 
questions about why people go to church and what they value about 
church, as well about what has changed in congregational life. When 
asked what had changed in congregational life in recent decades, a 
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frequent answer was that it had become more ‘informal’, that coffee 
and chat after the service had become more important, and that there 
is now greater lay participation in the church community. 
Of course this turn towards ‘community’ in the sense of the 
congregational community (or at least the community of committed 
members) is yet another sign not only of the marking and raising of 
church boundaries, but also of their shrinkage: from being coterminous 
with the boundaries of society, a particular group within society, or 
even a denomination, to becoming identical with the boundaries of 
the congregation. To some degree the emphasis on community is able 
to accommodate the subjective turn, for this is community bound 
by ties of ‘informal’ affection as much as ‘formal’ belonging to a 
hierarchical church order – something which is even clearer in relation 
to the small groups, including cell groups, which have also become 
more important in congregational life. Equally, however, the notion 
of community is able to support the idea that there is a common good 
which transcends my personal wellbeing, and to which I should in 
some sense be subject. As such, it is able to draw up the boundaries of 
Christian identity, whilst drawing in just a little of the wider culture. 
Shoots of vitality
By way of conclusion, I would like to draw attention not to fully-
fledged trends in church life, but to a few shoots of growth and vitality 
which may or may not turn into something more sustained. Taken 
together they may offer some hints of the sort of Christianity that may 
be able to make headway within a subjectivised culture (besides the 
more conservative, counter-cultural varieties of Christianity discussed 
above). 
I begin with the success of what might be called ‘spectacle-’ or ‘event-
based’ Christianity. What I have in mind is, for example, the success 
of the World Youth Day mentioned above, and the many earlier 
rallies presided over by Pope John Paul II, or the growth of interest 
and engagement in pilgrimage in the last few decades. Lourdes, 
for instance, now receives around six million visitors a year, and 
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Medjugorje has gone beyond being a regional pilgrimage centre with a 
clientele centred on the former Yugoslav region, to one now attracting 
a growing international pilgrimage community, in which there is a 
particularly strong American Catholic presence, with organised 
pilgrimage tours there run by American organisations.4
What such developments suggest is not a massive revival of interest 
in church-based Christianity, but the interest amongst people of many 
different ages in events which have a basis in Christian tradition, but 
which allow for individual participation – and mood-enhancement 
– in a collective context. In other words, they allow people to draw on 
some powerful resources of the Christian tradition in a way that is not 
found to be threatening or overwhelming to individuality. Pilgrimage 
serves as a powerful metaphor for the ‘journey’ of the individual self 
as it develops its own unique life-project. You can have your own 
experiences on a pilgrimage, even though you are doing so within a 
context and limits laid down by tradition. The latter gives shape to the 
experience, but does not dictate it. 
Similar factors may lie behind another sign of vitality: a renewed 
interest in some quarters in liturgical Christianity. I have in mind, 
for example, the growth of interest in Orthodox worship on the part 
of mainly educated and middle-class people in countries like Britain 
and America – or the relative success of cathedrals and cathedral 
worship in Britain. So long as they are not too heavily clericalised 
nor too didactic, liturgical forms of worship can perform a similar 
function as pilgrimage: drawing on aspects of the Christian tradition 
in a way which can stimulate subjective life very powerfully, without 
compromising personal projects of the self. As one of my interviewees 
in Kendal explained, she uses the ritual of high Anglican communion 
as a focus for her own meditation practice. Equally, such subjectivised 
sacramentalism offers the stimulation of a collective engagement 
without the troublesome demand of commitment to the ‘higher good’ 
of a church community. 
Such pockets of vitality also have in common the fact that they engage 
many or all of the five senses. As with holistic spirituality, there is a 
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clear demand for forms of engagement with the sacred which engage 
the whole person – body, mind and spirit. Such engagement is still 
relatively rare in most congregations, particularly Protestant ones, 
where word-and-mind are catered for, but there little explicit attention 
or stimulation is given to the body and emotions (at least, unique 
personal emotions rather than the common emotions engendered by 
music and worship). The broadening of attention from the mental and 
spiritual dimensions of existence to the bodily, affective and natural/
material world has, of course, been a feature of other areas of vitality, 
such as (neo) Celtic spirituality, liturgical dance, and the practice of 
labyrinth-walking. 
Finally one must make mention of the success of Christian retreats, 
retreat-houses and spiritual direction. All appear to be flourishing, 
and all bring ancient resources to bear on individual lives, subjective 
concerns, and desires for spiritual growth. Emotions nearly always 
occupy a central place, as does personal development (with a great 
deal of interest in tools of personal analysis such as the Enneagram). 
In addition, the body appears to be becoming more prominent, not 
only in the beautiful built and natural environments that many retreat 
centres boast, but in such offerings as massage, aromatherapy and 
other cross-over offerings with the holistic milieu. 
This brief survey hardly adds up to a rounded portrait of the sort of 
Christianity that may succeed in the West in coming decades, nor 
provides a recipe for any such thing. It may, however, contain hints 
of some of the ingredients that will have to be included, and some of 
the priorities that will need to be attended to. The underlying message 
seems to be that it is not necessary to abandon the Christian tradition 
in a rush to cater for the latest needs of a subjectivised marketplace. 
Rather, it may be possible to respect the validity of the deeply-cherished 
contemporary desire to forge worthwhile projects of the self which 
take personal wellbeing seriously, whilst maintaining commitment 
to the belief that the Christian tradition contains resources that can 
broaden, deepen and enrich such an enterprise. 
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1  For further information and data see www.kendalproject.org.uk. 
2  For a summary and discussion of the accumulating evidence of 
significant church decline in the USA since the 1970s see Heelas 
and Woodhead 2005, 55-60.
3  The evidence is gathered in Heelas and Woodhead 2005, 50-68; 
139-141.
4  These remarks draw on the unpublished work of my colleague Ian 
Reader, in particular his paper ‘Pilgrimage Growth in the Modern 
World: Meanings and Implications’.
